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1. Introduction 
1.1. Alternative Monetary Regimes 
Several scholars, notably Black ( 1970), Hayek ( 1976), Fama 
(1980, 1983), Hall (1982), White (1984) and Greenfield and Yeager 
(1983, 1989), have recently focussed attention on the possibility 
and in some cases desirability of alternative monetary regimes or 
1 payments systems. These alternatives all involve the removal of 
banking regulations as we know them today, the possible 
replacement of these regulations with others, and the emergence of 
institutional arrangements ranging from competitive currency issue 
to 'cashless' or accounting systems of exchange~ These 
institutional arrangements purportedly have properties making them 
preferable to existing fiat currency regimes, such as a stable 
price-level (Hall 1982), the elimination of 'painful monetary 
disequilibrium' (Greenfield and Yeager 1983, 1989), or a banking 
system not prone to systemic financial crises (White 1984). 
The roots of the proposals we consider can often be traced 
back to either or both of two schools of thought, which we label 
as laissez-faire and public choice respectively. The laissez-faire 
doctrine holds that 'free' competition evolves institutional and 
social arrangements which are superior to those which could be 
constructed through explicit design and deliberately imposed. 
1This paper ignores the ' legal restrictions' literature (for 
example Wallace 1988 and Bryant 1989) since this is not so much 
concerned with an al terna ti ve monetary regime as with deriving 
results about 'money' when it is purely a store a value providing 
no medium of exchange services. For a critique of this approach, 
see White (1987) and McCallum (1983). 
1 
• 
According to this view there is a prima facie case for unregulated 
banking 2 ; thus several of the proposals include the removal of 
existing banking regulations (for instance the prohibition of 
private currency issue). On the other hand, the principle of 
laissez-faire alone does not elicit any particular well-defined 
set of institutional arrangements, hence the validity of the 
principle itself is not an issue we address in this paper 3 • 
Public choice theory has produced a shift from a 
public-interest to a private-interest interpretation of government 
activity, in particular the implementation of policy. Thus 
al though monetary authorities purport ( and may be perceived) to 
have certain public-interest objectives, this view contends that 
they have the incentive and ability to deviate from these 
objectives. Thus inflationary episodes (for example) are 
attributed to the discretionary behaviour of the monetary 
authorities, and alternative monetary systems are posited in order 
to avoid the 'inherent' inflationary tendencies the public choice 
view attributes to monetary authorities under existing fiat 
4 
standards . Cooper (1982) points out, however, that it is 
questionable whether "one should think that experts are more 
clever at devising operational nondiscretionary monetary regimes 
than they are at monetary management within a discretionary 
2 See for example Hayek (1984) and Dowd (1988). 
3 Neither do we take up the issue of whether or not there is any 
inherent role for the government in providing currency (see Vaubel 
1984 and Friedman and Schwartz 1986 on this issue). 
4 
Goodhart (1989) discusses this in some detail . 
2 
regime" (1982:45). His argument is that if the motivation for a 
nondiscretionary regime is siirJ.PlY another way of assigning 
priority to the objective of price stability, then we can 
achieve,'this directly by instructing existing Central Banks to take 
whatever action is necessary to achieve price stability. He goes 
on to note that "if collectively we are ambivalent about [this] 
priority, [then] that is the principal source of the problem, not 
the nature of the regime" (1982:45). 
According to Cooper's argument, the problem to be addressed 
is not necessarily the choice of an alternative monetary regime, 
but rather that of finding incentives which will render the 
monetary authorities' private interests closest to the public 
interest. Again, it is not our objective to derive any conclusions 
regarding this issue. 
The objective of this paper, rather, is to test each proposed 
alternative monetary regime for operationality (defined below) 
according to an analytical method we now specify. 
1.2. Methodology 
Although the proposed alternative monetary regimes have 
received critical attention from White (1984), McCallum (1985), 
O' Driscoll ( 1987) and Hoover ( 1988), we are not aware of any 
systematic and coherent er i ti cal appraisal. The main motivation 
for this paper is that neither the originators nor the critics 
seem thus far to have provided satisfactory treatments of the 
' operationality' of the above proposals. Considering that most of 
the proposed payments systems are forwarded as potential 
alternatives to existing fiat currency systems, this is a serious 
3 
shortcoming. 
For each proposed payments system that this paper considers, 
the analytical method which is adopted for this objective is as 
follows: 
(I) The institutional arrangements defining the proposed payments 
system are specified. 
(II) This payments system is then embedded in an economy in which 
pricing decisions are made by agents in decentralised 
markets. 
Part (I) of our methodology is relevant since in various parts of 
the literature institutional specifications are often incomplete, 
ambiguous or inconsistent. This is typically the consequence of 
writers assuming that consensus exists as to the meaning of 
various notions they employ, particularly the term ' money'. Other 
examples are terms like 'banks' or ' deposits', which are used out 
of their familiar contexts, without adequate redefinition. 
This paper contends that designating a payments system as 
being either with or without 'money' only leads to confusion, as 
each reader is likely to consider ' money' in terms of its 
different possible attributes. The term ' money' is n_ot essential 
in describing any 'monetary' or payments system, even though it is 
common to read of the medium of exchange or unit of account 
functions of money ( see Goodhart 1983) . Assertions of this kind 
are misleading because money can only ever be defined in terms of 
these properties: they are logically prior to any definition of 
money we may erect. Thus it can only make sense to speak of ' the 
role of money' once some consistent definition of what 'money' is 
4 
has been established5 • 
In this paper the term 'money' is avoided. Instead, the terms 
' medium of exchange', 'medium of account' and ' unit of account' as 
defined in McCall um (1985:5) will constitute our basic 
terminology. Further terms, such as ' banks' or 'deposits', will be 
defined, when they arise, in terms of their specific contexts. 
Turning to (II) of our methodology, the literature 6 often 
implicitly assumes that there is some (often unspecified) price 
adjustment mechanism in the economy . which is consistent with (I). 
Operationality is then assumed rather than proved. We address this 
problem by explicitly adopting, via (II), a framework in which 
prices are determined in decentralised markets 7 • If it can be 
shown that (I) is consistent with (II), that is, if the 'rule~ of 
the game' defining a payments system can be sustained over time in 
an economy with market prid-ng, then we consider the proposed 
system to be operational. If a system is, or can be made 
operational we examine whether it indeed has the properties 
claimed for it, and whether it has any other properties which 
might be deemed as 'desirable'. This should then enable some 
greater consensus as to which of the proposals for monetary_reform 
are worthy of further academic discussion and, potentially, · 
5 0 sborne (1984) notes at least ten discernible approaches to the 
definition of money in the literature, each emphasising different 
properties of money. He concludes that only three seem to capture 
the ' salient' properties of money. All this points to, however, is 
yet another approach to the definition of money. 
6White (1984) and Greenfield and Yeager (1989) are exceptions. 
7 0 r G as reenfield and Yeager (1983:848) put it, via 
"honest-to-goodness market activity". 
5 
implementation. 
1. 3. Outline 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Chapter 2 examines 
the operationality of monetary systems which are derivatives of a 
conventional commodity standard; that is, their common feature is 
an agency, or competing agencies such as private banks, standing 
ready to convert the medium of exchange into some commodity or 
composite commodity at a specified rate. As this characteristic is 
central to many of the proposals for monetary reform, namely Hall 
(1982), White (1984) and Greenfield and Yeager (1983, 1989), this 
chapter forms the major part of this paper. Chapter 3 examines a 
proposal by Hayek ( 1976) for a monetary system characterised by 
competing issuers of inconvertible fiduciary currencies, while 
Chapter 4 looks at the operationality of accounting systems of 
exchange as envisaged by Black (1970) and Fama (1980, 1983). The 
conclusions of the paper are listed in table form on the following 
two pages. The table outlines the defining characteristics of each 
proposal, states whether we find it operational, and lists the 
properties of the regime. Both the commodity standard and free 
banking regimes have existed as monetary systems in the past, and 
are thus clearly operational. They are nonetheless included for 
completeness, as well as for purposes of comparison with other 
regimes in terms of their properties. 
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RE GIME 
Co mm o dity S tandard with 
a Central Bank 
(eg . g o ld s tandard) 
'V a riable' Comm o dity 
St a ndard 
F is her (191 2 ) 
Hall (198 2 ) 
'Fre e' B;;,nking 
\J hit c> (1984) 
BFH S y s tem 
Gr c> enfield and Ye a ger 
(1 9 8 3, 198 9) 
RULE S 
Unit of a c c o unt d e fin ed 
in terms of a co mm o dity . 
Central Bank i s mono p o ly 
i ss uer of co nvertibl e 
c urren c y . 
Monetary c o mm o dity n as a 
fixed currency pri ce. 
As above; but mo n e t a ry 
commodity ha s ~ariab) e 
currency price a cc ording 
to feedback rule . 
Unit of a cco unt d e f i n ed 
in term s o f a co mm o dity. 
Co mpetitively i s sued 
co nvertibl e c urren c y . 
Monetary co mm o dity h as 
a fixed curren c y pri ce. 
Unit o f a cco unt defin ed 
in term s of a co mm o d i ty 
bundle . 
Co mpetitiv e ly iss u e d 
co nvertibl e cu rr e n c y . 
Indirect r e d e em a bil ity . 
Tw o curr e n c y pri ces f o r 
th e redempti o n medium . 
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OPERATIONAL? 
Yes 
Ye s 
Ye s 
No 
PROPERTIE S 
Price level d e termin ed 
by supply of and demand 
for monetary commodity . 
Resource cost of 
convertible currency . 
Possibility of banking 
crises . 
As Above. 
As Abov e . 
REG I.ME 
BFH Variant 
Compe ting Fiduciary 
Currencies 
Hayek (1978) 
Acco unting S ystem 
with out a Central 
Ban k. 
Black (1970) 
Fam a (1980, 1983) 
Acc o unting S y stem 
with a Central 
B;,nk . 
RULES OPERATIONAL? 
B o th competitively i ss ue d 
c urren c y and redempti o n 
medium coexist a s medi a 
of exchange . 
Indirect redeemability . 
Banks set currency price 
of redemption medium . 
Competing inconvertibl e 
'brand name' currencie s. 
Flexible exchange rate s 
between c urren c ie s. 
Is s uers regul a t e curren c y 
issue via intere s t rate on 
loan s and depo si ts o f 
their currency 
Medium of account i s a 
co mmodity . 
Medium of ac co unt is 
directly tract ab le 
against a sse t( s ) 
Bank s are competitive 
mutu al fund s. 
A s above; but mediu m 
acco unt is accounting 
liability o f Ce ntr al 
Bank . 
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of 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Ye s 
PROPERTIES 
System mu s t coexist 
with conventional 
commodity of fiat 
standard 
'Monetary dis-
equilibrium' persists. 
Possibility of banking 
crises. 
Stab le price level( s ) 
No re so urce costs . 
Po ss ibility o f banking 
cri 2 es. 
P a ym e nts occur vi a an 
account ing sy s tem . ' 
Price level determin ed 
by s upply of and d emand 
for medium o f accou nt . 
Payments system immune 
to banking cr i ses. 
A s above; but Cen tr al 
Bank ca n determine 
price l evel vi a 
monetary policy . 
2. Commodity Standards 
2.1. A Commodity Standard with a Central Bank 
Introduction 
As we have noted, several of the proposed monetary systems 
considered are variants of a ' conventional' commodity . standard8 • 
This section therefore describes such a commodity standard in a 
general way and, further, outlines the adjustment process 
rendering such a system operational. Doing this allows us to 
establish more precisely how the proposed variants in fact differ 
from a 'conventional' commodity standard and, more importantly, 
whether they have any properties which distinguish them either 
from such a standard or existing fiat standards. 
Description 
We will take the defining characteristics of a commodity 
standard with a Central Bank to be: 
(i) that the national monetary unit (unit of account) is defined 
in terms of a given quantity of either a single commodity or 
some composite ' basket' of commodities 9 ; 
(ii) that the Central Bank or Treasury is committed to exchanging 
this commodity, or composite commodity, for the national 
currency at the fixed price implied by the definition in (i), 
8 The primary historical example of such a regime, of course, is 
the gold standard (1820 - 1914). 
9 See Cooper ( 1982) for a discussion of the gold standard, and 
Beale, Kennedy and Winn (1942) and Friedman (1951) for discussions 
of composite commodity standards 
9 
and this is the only channel by which currency is issued; 
(iii) that the Central bank is the sole issuer of the national 
currency, which consists of token paper or coin denominated 
in the monetary unit; and 
(iv) that prices are routinely quoted in terms of the defined 
monetary unit, and that currency as well as bank deposits 
convertible on demand into currency serve as the routinely 
used medium of exchange. 
An obvious implication of (ii) is that, assuming no costs to 
exchanging the monetary commodity for currency (or vice versa) at 
the Bank or Treasury, there cannot be an independent, 
market-determined price for the monetary commodity. If there is 
only one good serving as the monetary commodity, as under the gold 
standard for example, agents in the gold market are price takers 
with respect to the currency price of gold. If more than one good 
serves as the monetary commodity, as under the composite commodity 
standards analysed by Friedman ( 1951), the individual prices of 
the goods comprising the standard bundle are free to vary but the 
price of the bundle itself (ie. the composite commodity) is not. 
As under a symmetallic standard, however, a rise in the currency 
price of any one of the components of the standard basket requires 
a fall in the prices of one or more of the other components of 
' this basket. Any discrepancy between the ' market' and official 
price of the standard basket would result in a process of 
arbitrage consistent with alleviating this discrepancy. 
Although contrary to experience under various commodity 
standards which have prevailed in the past, we will assume that 
the Bank or Treasury pursues a non-discretionary policy with 
10 
regard to the monetary unit; that is, it is believed that the 
monetary authorities will maintain their pegged price, and will 
always hold commodity reserves sufficient to this purpose 10 • This 
implies, in effect, that the Central Bank subsumes domestic 
economic objectives to the maintainance of gold convertibility and 
external (balance of payments) stability. Thus, a further 
characteristic of the commodity standard described here is: 
( v) that the Central Bank does not grant accomodation to the 
banking system, and that Bank rate is not a monetary policy 
instrument. 
This assumption is justified on the grounds that Central Banks 
under a commodity standard could, in any case, pursue independent 
domestic policy using Bank rate only within narrow limits and for 
short periods. As Keynes (1931:271) pointed out with regard to the 
gold standard, "if any country tried to maintain a higher [Bank] 
rate than its neighbours, gold would flow towards it until either 
it gave way or the international system broke down by its having 
absorbed all the gold in the world. And if it tried to maintain a 
lower rate, gold would flow out until either it gave way or had to 
leave the international system through having lost all its gold" 
Note that banking regulations, in particular 
statutory reserve requirements, are not listed among the defining 
characteristics of the commodity standard described here. Although 
banks issue deposit liabilities convertible on demand into 
10 See Borda and Schwartz (1984) 
Clearly a major motivation for 
considered by this paper is --
tells us -- that this assumption 
for historical evidence of this. 
the alternative monetary systems 
as the public choice literature 
is not justified. 
11 
currency issued exclusively by the Central Bank, and would 
typically be required to hold a fraction of their assets in the 
form of non interest-bearing stocks of currency or deposits at the 
' 
Bank, we argue here that such statutory reserve requirements are 
irrelevant to the operationality of any banking system. Moreover, 
this holds irrespective of whether banks operate under a fiat or 
commodity standard, or whether or not banks have access to Central 
B k d . 11 an accomo ation . 
If banks do have access to Central Bank accomodation they 
need only hold a minimal amount of currency for daily redemption 
purposes, since any large withdrawals of. deposits can be met by 
borrowing from the Bank. Required reserves are thus unnecessary to 
banks as a source of liquidity. If banks, however, do not have 
access to accomodation, then required reserves are conventionally 
thought to be a source of liquidity in the event of large deposit 
withdrawals. This is clearly not the case: since they are legally 
' required' , these funds are not available as ' reserves' . Thus 
banks would still have to hold excess reserves to satisfy nett 
redemption outflows. 
Klein (1974) argues that non-interest bearing required 
reserves, in this context, should be treate~ simply as a tax on 
banking firms 12 • Due to th~ costs of foregone interest, we might 
1 1 Klein (1974:442) also reaches this conclusion. As he points out, 
enforcement of the convertibility of bank liabilities into 
government currency is the governmental intervention relevant to 
operationality in this case. 
1 2 Fama (1983) argues that a demand for inconvertible currency for 
transactions purposes is sufficient to determine the price level, 
12 
expect banks to offer lower deposit rates and charge higher 
lending rates; that is, increase their ' spread'. This presumably 
leads to less intermediation by banks than would pertain in the 
absence of reserve requirements. In the system described here, 
therefore, we will assume: 
(vi) that banks are not legally required to hold reserves but, 
given (v), voluntarily hold excess reserves. In the event of 
illiquidity banks must obtain access to currency by selling 
assets. 
Operationality 
Although the system described here assumes that token 
cu rrency (and bank deposits) serves as the circulating medium, the 
convertibility undertaken by the Central Bank implies that the 
p r ice level is determined as if the monetary commodity itself was 
. the actual medium of exchange (Mccallum 1989). As mainstream 
theory indicates; an excess supply of the monetary commodity 
implies an excess supply of currency and, through an increased 
demand for goods, a rise in the currency prices of goods in 
general (see for example Barro 1979). This result, however, holds 
s tri ctly only in a one-good economy: it is legitimate to derive 
conclusions concerning the ' purchasing power' of the monetary unit 
o n ly under the assumption that the relative prices of the goods 
comprising the price index used to measure this magnitude are 
constant . Although this is well known, conventional theory gives 
given a well-defined supply of such currency. Required reserves, 
then, are unneccesary for a finite, determinate price level in 
such a system also . 
13 
the impression that no definitional problems are associated with 
concepts such as ' purchasing power' and ' the price level' and such 
terms are used without qualification. In order to maintain 
correspondence with the literature we draw attention to this 
caveat here but continue to employ these terms. 
We can, then, express the relative price of 'goods in 
general' ( which we denote as g) against the monetary commodity 
(which we denote as m) under a commodity standard as follows: 
p = ( 1 ) gm 
where Pg$ denotes the currency price of goods, and Pm$ the 
official, fixed currency price of the monetary commodity. An 
excess supply of the monetary commodity would~ due to an increase 
in the supply of currency and an increased demand for goods, be 
reflected in higher currency prices of goods and hence a lower 
relative value of the monetary commodity against goods 13 • According 
to received theory this would result in more of the monetary 
commodity being demanded, either for export or non-monetary uses, 
and less of it being supplied due to the decreased relative 
profitability of this activity. In the absence of further demand 
or supply ' shocks', the price level would rise until the value (or 
purchasing power) of the monetary commodity was equal to the 
1 3 Cl 1 . . ear y an increase 1n Pg$ simply implies that on average prices 
have risen. Individual prices over the relevant period, however, 
will rise by more or less than this average, or even change in the 
oppsite direction to this average. 
14 
marginal cost of production (in terms of goods in general) of that 
commodity (Mccallum 1989). A commonly cited advantage of a 
commodity standard, therefore, is its presumed tendency toward a 
predictable long-run value of the monetary unit; that is, its 
predictability depends largely on the predictability of the 
i ncrease in the supply of the monetary commodity ( Campbell and 
Dougan, 1986) 14 • 
A further point can be made here as regards the 
i nterpretation attached to equation (1) above. Although prices are 
routinely quoted i n the monetary unit, and currency and bank 
deposits denominated in this unit are the routinely used media of 
exchange, the authorities' commitment to exchange the monetary 
commodity for currency at the announced price (Pm$) implies that 
bi lateral exchanges of the monetary commodity for goods may well 
b e acceptable to agents. Equation (1) indicates that the amount of 
the monetary commodity necessary to conclude such transactions 
(that is, the price of goods in terms of the monetary commodity, 
P ) would be derived gm from the currency prices of the goods 
p u rchased, 
commodity, 
Pg$' and the official 
p 1 5 
m$ 
currency price of the monetary 
14 I t 1· s 11 d d h ( f 1 C 1982) we ocumente , owever see or examp e ooper , 
t h at the gold standard era was in fact characterised by 
considerable fluctuations in the price level due to changes in the 
s u pply of gold. 
15As will become apparent, 
of the proposals of Hall 
19 89 ). 
this point is crucial to the assessment 
(1982) and Greenfield and Yeager (1983, 
15 
Conclusion 
Commodity standards of the type described in this section are 
indeed operational in terms of our definition, as is supported by 
historical evidence. Although no composite commodity standard with 
a large number of commodities defining the monetary unit has 
existed, the above argument suggests that such a system, too, 
could be operational. 
Some conclusions regarding the properties of a commodity 
standard as described here can now be drawn. According to Barro 
' 
(1979:32), "in relation to a fiat currency regime, the key element 
of a commodity standard is its potential for automaticity and 
consequent absence of political control of the quantity bf money 
and the absolute price level". This absence of control, however, 
implies that there is nothing in the rules of a commodity standard 
which can keep inflation at zero (or, for that matter, at any 
other level). Indeed, any unanticipated event that affects the 
market of the monetary commodity will affect prices under a 
commodity standard. On the basis of an empirical study, Meltzer 
(1986) concludes that 'risk' and ' uncertainty' (in the sense of 
Knight and Keynes respectively) for prices were greater under the 
pre-war gold standard than any subsequent . 1 6 regime Commodity 
standards also naturally have a higher resource cost than fiat 
standards, and we expect these costs to rise with the number of 
goods comprising the ' monetary' commodity (see Friedman 1951). 
Bearing these properties in mind, we now turn our attention to 
16 Meltzer (1986) also finds 
predictable now than under 
expected change is larger. 
that the change in prices is more 
earlier regimes, even though the 
16 
the proposed variants of a commodity standard. 
17 
2.2. 'Variable' Commodity Standards 
Introduction 
The study by Meltzer (1986), as well as historical evidence 
provided by Cooper (1982) and Schwartz (1986), indicate that· price 
stability did not in fact characterise the gold standard (1820 -
1914). Fisher (1912) thus proposed a variant of the gold standard 
which he called the 'Compensated' Dollar system. Such a regime, he 
claimed, would isolate the purchasing power of the monetary unit 
from "the chances of gold mining" (1912:502) and create "a 
standard monetary yardstick, a stable dollar" (1912:502). 
Hall (1982, 1984) has recently revived Fisher's notion of a 
' variable' commodity standard in the form of a proposal which he 
has called an ANCAP standard. Hall's regime differs from that 
forwarded by Fisher only in detail, and resembles closely a 
composite commodity standard as described in the previous section. 
This section, after describing each of these proposals in 
turn, finds both systems to be operational, but finds neither to 
have the properties claimed for them by their originators or 
subsequent.commentators. 
2.2.1. The 'Compensated' Dollar 
Description 
Fisher's proposal modifies the specification of a commodity 
standard outlined in the previous section in cue significant 
respect. Instead of exchanging the monetary commodity (ie. gold) 
for the national currency (ie. the paper dollar) at a fixed price, 
Fisher proposes that the monetary authorities "mark up or down the 
weight of the dollar (that is, ... mark down or up the [dollar] 
18 
price of gold bullion) in exact proportion to the deviation above 
or below par of an index number of [dollar] prices" (1912:498). 
This would ensure, according to Fisher, that one dollar of gold 
would "always buy approximately [a] composite basketful of goods" 
( quoted in Borde 1984: 53). Subsequent commentators ( see Cooper 
1988) thus argue that Fisher's scheme amounts to a 'tabular 
standard'; that is, it is similar in effect to a composite 
commodity standard, but has currency convertible only into a 
single commodity (ie. gold). 
Under this scheme, then, the official dollar price of gold at 
any point in time, Pm$Ct>' is linked to a dollar price index via a 
policy feedback rule 17 , which we can express as follows: 
= 
p 
m$ ( o) 
(l+o:) 
t 
( 2 ) 
where o:t = (CPit - CPI 0 ) I CPI 0 is the fractional devia~ion of a 
consumer price index at time t from its value at some initial time 
t = 0, and P
9
$Co) is the dollar price of gold at time 0, ie. when 
the index was at par. 
Equation (2) indicates that a higher dollar price level at 
time t, since o:t is then greater than zero, is consistent with a 
proportionately lower official dollar gold price. In other words, 
when dollar prices rise, the authorities stand ready to redeem 
dollar-denominated currency for more gold than before and of fer 
1 7 
Black (1988) has recently described and endorsed a proposal for a 
gold standard with such a feedback rule. 
19 
less currency in exchange for a given amount of gold than before. 
Operationality 
Al though recently endorsed by various 18 commentators as a 
means of achieving price stability under a commodity standard, it 
is shown here that Fisher's proposal neither achieves this aim, 
nor does it in any sense 'compensate' dollar holders in the event 
of a higher price level. 
Assume that a new ore discov~ry ( ie. an excess supply of 
gold) precipitates, via an increased demand for goods, a rise in 
the dollar prices of goods. Equation (2) implies that this causes 
the monetary authorities to lower their announced dollar price of 
gold. Al though agents can now purchase more gold per dollar of 
currency, this does not imply that they can still purchase the 
same basket of commodities per. dollar of currency. This would be 
possible only if lowering the official dollar gold price 
immediately caused the dollar prices of goods to fall. There is no 
reason why this action by the authorities should, in itself, bring 
about this result in Fisher's regime. 
Furthermore, if we recall equation (1) above, it becomes 
apparent th·a t lowering the official dollar price of gold (Pm$) 
after dollar prices in general (Pg$) have risen accentuates --
rather than compensates for -- gold's loss · of purchasing power 
against goods ( p ) . gm In other words, a given amount of gold now 
buys less goods than before not only because the prices of goods 
18 See Fama (1983), Black (1988), Cooper (1988) and The Economist 
(Jan 6 1990). 
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have risen, but also because a given amount of gold now buys less 
currency than before. In sum, ~he supposed ' compensation' of 
Fisher's rule does not help those agents who hold wealth in the 
form of currency or deposits, whilst it penalises those agents who 
hold wealth in the form of gold. 
The upshot is that Fisher's variant of the gold standard, 
rather than compensate for changes in the purchasing power of the 
doliar, merely augments the ' automatic' price level adjustment (as 
outlined in the previous section) whereby non-zero excess demands 
of gold are eliminated under such a system. By accentuating the 
loss of purchasing power of gold (and so also its relative 
profitability) when the price level rises, we can expect a sharper 
fall in the supply of gold under this system than under the 
conventional gold standard . In terms of the discussion in the 
previous section, this could imply a faster elimination of the 
excess supply of or demand for gold than would have pertained 
otherwise. Alternatively, it · could possibly imply unstable 
oscillations of the dollar price level. The equilibrating process 
however remains the same: prices of goods fall due to the lower 
demand arising from a reduction in the supply of gold. 
As a variant of a conventional commodity standard Fisher's 
system is operational, but cannot avoid the price level 
consequences implied by non-zero excess demands for the monetary 
commodity under such a system. Since it neither isolates the 
monetary unit from the ' chances of gold mining' 1 9 nor maintains 
19
This point becomes obvious if one considers Fisher's rule as a 
feedback rule - dollar prices ' in general' must rise prior to any 
adjustment in the official gold price. 
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the purchasing power of the monetary unit, the system does not 
have the properties ascribed ascribed to it by its originator. 
In light of the caveat raised in the preceding section 
regard~ng 'purchasing power', a final point concerning Fisher's 
notion of 'compensation' should be made. We have noted the well 
known fact that index numbers simply express an average of dollar 
price variations, and tell us nothing about the individual dollar 
price variations of the goods compri~ing that index; Consequently, 
' compensation' for changes in purchasing power based on this 
average, even if it could be achieved, would be arbitrary with 
respect to individual agents, since agents have different 
consumption bundles and are thus affected differently by these 
individual price variations. 
2.2.2. The ANCAP Standard 
Description 
Unlike Fisher, Hall suggests that the dollar (the unit of 
account) be defined in terms of a resource unit' called the 
ANCAP, since it comprises specified quantities of ammonium 
nitrate, copper, aluminium and plywood. These commodities are 
chosen because, unlike gold, their combined purchasing power 20 has 
been historically stable. Defining the dollar in terms of this 
resource unit would, according to Hall, by itself "come close to 
stabilising the cost of living" (1982:115). Clearly this proceeds 
on the assumption that the conditions contributing to the 
2 0 Th . h . at is, t e1r combined dollar value relative to some dollar 
price index like the CPI. 
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stability of the price of the ANCAP relative to the CPI will 
prevail into the future. Given the change of monetary regime that 
Hall is advocating, and the central role of the ANCAP in this 
regime, it is unclear whether this assumption is justified. This 
is, however, not a central issue for our analysis. 
According to Hall, the resource unit itself would be 
designated as legal tender and "would replace dollar bills and the 
accounting entries [ie. bank deposits) currently serving as legal 
tender Of course, the physical resources would not actually 
circulate as currency 11 (1982:112). As Mccallum (1985) points out, 
Hall does not specify what actually serves as the medium of 
exchange. Hall emphasises, however, that the government ' sets' the 
dollar price of the ANCAP resource unit, and that market processes 
keep the sum of the dollar market prices of the ANCAP commodities 
equal to the announced price. We can assume, therefore, that the 
-government (Central Bank) is the sole issuer of 
dollar-denominated currency, it stands ready to exchange this 
currency for . ANCAP's at the chosen price, and it holds reserves of 
ANCAPs sufficient for this 21 purpose In the absence of such 
institutional arrangements it is difficult to see how the 
t ld ' ' h d 11 . f the ANCAP 22 . and, governmen cou set t e o ar price o 
moreover, how this price could be adjusted over time according to 
2 1Hall ( 2) 198 proposes that the gov€rnment should not hold ANCAP 
reserves so as to prevent it from intervening in the ANCAP 
commodity markets. Clea-rly the government must hold some reserves 
in order to successfully set the dollar price of the ANCAP. 
22 1 . . 1 . 1 tis conceivab e -- but unlike y -- that regulations be imposed 
on private bank::: to undertake convertibility of distinguishable 
bank notes into ANCAP's at a rate specified by the government. 
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some feedback rule (see below). As under a conventional commodity 
standard, banks issue dollar-denominated deposits convertible on 
demand into currency, which also serve as a medium of exchange. 
Having specified these arrangements, it is apparent that 
designating ANCAPs as legal tender is a super£ luous feature of 
Hall's proposal, since agents can always o};)tain the necessary 
' dollars worth' of ANCAPs at the announced dollar price should 
anyone require them as payment. In other words, the price of goods 
in terms of ANCAPs is derived from their dollar price and from the 
official dollar price of ANCAPs in the manner implied by equation 
( 1 ) in section 2.1. above. 
Following Fisher, Hall proposes that the government adopt the 
following feedback rule for setting the dollar price of the ANCAP: 
"Each month, depress the dollar price of the resource unit by 
one-twelfth of the amount by which the most recent CPI exceeds the 
target level" (1982:118). Comparison with equation (2) above shows 
that this rule simply advocates smaller adjustments to tfie dollar 
price of the monetary commodity in response to a given price level 
change than does Fisher's, but is otherwise identical 23 • Such a 
po l icy by the monetary authorities, according to Hal 1, "defines 
t h e dollar as enough resource units to buy the CPI basket at its 
most recently measured price" (1982:116) and implies that "the 
pu rchasing power [of the dollar] remains constant as time passes" 
( 1982 : 115). 
23 As Hall puts it, "apply Fisher's formula monthly at annual rates" 
(1 982:118). 
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Operationality 
As we noted above, the ANCAP standard described here is not 
fundamentally different from Fisher's ' compensated' dollar system, 
and is simply a variant of a conventional composite-commodity 
standard as described in section 2.1. Consequently, the system is 
operational according to the same argument as presented in that 
section. Hall, however, specifies the manner in which the feedback 
rule of the monetary authorities acts to maintain price stability, 
and this is discussed here. 
Assume that the dollar price level rises above the 'target 
level' chosen by the authorities, and that the announced dollar 
price of the ANCAP is lowered accordingly. Hall argues that, under 
this scenario, "sellers who do not adjust their dollar prices 
downward will be asking for more resources in return for what they 
are selling. There will be an _excess supply in all markets where 
prices do not fall immediately ... [andlthus the redefinition of 
the dollar puts downward pressure on 
(1982:117). 
prices in the economy" 
Recall that agents routinely post prices in dollars, and 
routinely use dollar denominated currency and bank deposits as 
media of exchange. There is thus no reason why a lower dollar 
price for ANCAPs should impinge on the dollar pricing decisions of 
agents in the manner suggested by Hall . Sellers of goods, by not 
lowering their dollar prices, are indeed demanding more ANCAPs for 
their goods . They will not, however, experience excess supplies of 
their goods, because the lower official dollar price of ANCAPs is 
consistent with sellers demanding more ANCAPs for any given 
dollar price of goods. As stated above, the authorities' 
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commitment to redeem currency for ANCAPs at an offically set 
dollar price implies that agents,- can always obtain the ANCAPs 
corresponding to a given 'dollar worth' of goods should they be 
required to pay with ANCAPs (recall that ANCAPs are legal tender). 
Lowering the dollar price of the ANCAP when the price level 
rises, then, does not amount to redefining the dollar as enough 
resource units to buy some standard commodity bundle. Just as in 
Fisher's system, this action by the authorities can, in itself, do 
nothing to 'compensate' agents for the lower purchasing power of 
dollar denominated media of exchange, whilst it penalises agents 
holding wealth in the form of ANCAPs. The lower dollar price of 
ANCAPs simply initiates the equilibrating process (of falling 
prices of goods due to a reduction in the supply of the monetary 
commodity) that characterises commodity standards in general. 
Conclusion 
As we have shown, a 'variable' commodity standard along the 
lines suggested by both Fisher and Hall is operational via the 
same adjustment process as that under a conventional commodity 
standard. Irrespective of whether the official currency price of 
the monetary commodity is fixed or variable according to some 
feedback rule, non-zero excess demands for the monetary commodity 
imply that the currency prices of goods in general will adjust to 
eliminate this. The purchasing power of the monetary unit in 
either system, then, does not remain constant over time. As it is 
not clear whether the price level can 
more predictable if the ~uthorities 
constant) the official price of the 
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be either more stable or 
vary (rather than keep 
monetary commodity, such 
regimes do not have any properties _ making them intrinsically 
preferable over conventional commodity standards or, according to 
the conclusions in section 2 . 1., over existing fiat standards. 
We turn now to proposals which retain convertibility of the 
medium of exchange into some commodity, but which assign this role 
t o private, competitive banks rath~r than a Central bank . 
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2.3. A Commodity Standard with 'Free' Banking 
Introduction 
The term 'free banking' has conventionally been used to 
describe periods in monetary history supposedly characteri·sed by 
relatively unregulated banking, with the two primary examples 
being the United States between 1837 1863 (Rolnick and Weber 
1988) and Scotland between 1800 1834 (White 1984a). As Klein 
(1974) points out, this term is somewhat of a misnomer since the 
distinguishing feature of these periods was relatively 
unrestricted entry into banking, as opposed to unregulated 
banking. Both in the U.S. and Scotland (see Mccallum 1989 and 
Cowen and Kroszner 1989 respectively) there were numerous ' free 
banking laws' circumscribing the activities of private 24 banks . 
Amongst others, these included regulations concerning statutory 
bond deposits, reserve requirements, the printing of bank notes, 
stockholder liability and par redemption. 
Clearly the specific legal restrictions imposed during the 
free banking era differed from place to place, and thus affected 
the development and activities of financial intermediaries in 
different ways. The common feature, however, of this period- seems 
to have been the presence of distinguishable, privately issued 
bank notes (and deposits) convertible on demand into a specified 
amount of specie (silver or gold). Free banking systems, 
therefore, have historically been commodity standards in which 
24 So much so that Cowen and Kroszner (1989) question whether the 
Scottish experience was indeed one of ' free' ( ie. laissez-£ a ire) 
banking 
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convertibility of currency into the monetary commodity was 
undertaken by private banks rather than a Central Bank or 
Treasury. The absence of any historical example of the private 
production of purely inconvertible fiduciary currencies 25 has led 
White (1983) to claim that "free bank ing on a specie standard is 
the most plausible monetary system free of government involvement" 
(1983:291). Given that he has been the major proponent of such a 
system as a potential alternative to existing fiat currency 
systems, the free banking system spe c ified in this section is 
drawn mainly from his contributions to the literature (see White 
1983, 1984, 1984a, and Selgin and White 1987). For purposes of 
simplification, the specification here does not incorporate the 
numerous place-specific regulations which were present in actual 
free banking systems in the past unless these are integral to the 
operationality of the system. 
This section finds a commodity standard with ' free' banking 
to be operational. It emerges that such a system has very similar 
price-level properties to a ' managed' commodity standard. Although 
proponents of ' free' banking hold that it is inherently preferable 
to a ' managed', regulated monetary system this claim . is, as yet, 
made without theoretical validation. 
Description 
We begin by assuming an economy where, either due to 
historical evolution or government decree, there exists a monetary 
~
5 Both Klein (1974) and Friedman and Schwartz (1986) acknowledge 
that they are unaware of any historical examples of such monetary 
arrangements. 
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unit called the dollar, which is defined in terms of a specified 
amount of gold. The government does not issue any claims 
( currency) denominated in dollars, designate anything as legal 
tender, or take any action to affect the purchasing power of the 
monetary unit. All details of organisation of financial 
intermediaries 26 are under the control of the private sector and, 
following White (1984), we elaborate these below. 
We assume that banks issue distinguishable bearer notes which 
they promise to convert, on demand, into the amount of gold specie 
corresponding to their dollar denomination. They also issue 
checkable deposits, which bear competitively determined interest 
rates, and are convertible on demand into either notes or specie 27 
Against these liabilities, we assume that banks hold assets 
consisting of gold specie, interest-earning loans and commercial 
paper, and equity. 
Dowd (1988) argues that competition between banks forces them 
to of fer liabilities in the form of a convertibility contract 
(notes and deposits convertible into gold) since off er ing 
inconvertible liabilities does not represent "a credible assurance 
that such notes and deposits would retain their value" (19_88:25, 
emphasis added) . This argument, which is commonly invoked among · 
the proponents of free banking , must however be qualified on two 
T 
counts. 
26 Banks, then, are bound by the law of contract only, and are not 
subject to any ' special' legislation (see Selgin 1988) 
27 Clearly banks may also issue notice and time deposits as they do 
today. 
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Firstly, the assurance of convertibility does not, by itself, 
establish the credibility of a oontract ( such as a bank note), 
since it is always possible that the issuing bank will renege on 
its promise. Rather, a contract becomes credible once agents 
expect -- or trust -- that the assurance will be maintained in the . 
future. A bank note should be considered credible because agents 
trust that the issuing bank will not suspend convertibility, and 
not. simply because the issuing bank offers convertibility. 
Credibility, then, is derived from the past performance and 
expected future behaviour of the issuing bank, and not 
convertibility per se. To use Klein's (1974) terms, offering 
convertibility is one way a bank can establish consumer confidence 
in the currency it issues, and should be seen as part of that 
banks investment in 'brand name capital'. 
Secondly, it is a misconception that a bank note that is 
convertible into gold represents a promise by the issuer to uphold 
the value (purchasing power) of that note. Being a promise to pay 
a fixed amount of gold, the purchasing power of a bank note is (as 
we des~ribed in section 2.1. above) ultimately determined by the 
supply of and demand for gold. Convertibility cannot guarantee the 
purchasing power of a note if there exists (say) an excess supplY. 
of gold since, under these circumstances, we would expect the 
prices of goods in general to be rising. 
White (1984) and Selgin and White (1987) suggest several 
reasons why a competitive banking environment would lead banks to 
accept each other's notes at par and, further, to settle interbank 
obligations via a centralised clearinghouse arrangement. 
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Historical evidence seems to support these 28 arguments We will 
assume, then, that banks contractually agree to accept -- at par 
the notes and deposits of the other member banks of a 
clearinghouse arrangement. Al though gold specie is the ultimate 
settlement or clearing asset among member banks, various other 
assets may ordinarily be acceptable to banks for clearing 
purposes. 
The above arrangement implies, in effect, that a bank stands 
ready to redeem not only its own notes and deposits for gold, but 
also those of its competitors. Should the public decide that a 
particular bank has become too ' risky' ·and either redeem their 
notes for gold or exchange them for the notes of another bank, the 
costs of the risky bank failing will be borne largely by the other 
member banks. We will assume, therefore, that the clearinghouse 
monitors the ' soundness' ( or solvency) of each member bank to 
assure the other members that its notes and deposits are safe to 
accept for clearing. Failure to comply with the clearinghouse' s 
definition of ' soundness' results in a bank being expel led from 
the arrangement, a clear negative signal concerning the bank's 
ability to redeem its liabilities. In the event that agents ' run' 
on such a bank because they perceive it to be illiquid, the bank 
may be forced to incur such substantial losses from selling its 
assets that it is ultimately rendered insolvent. 
Finally, then, we assume that the clearinghouse arrangement 
provides a source of reserves to banks experiencing liquidity 
28See Mullineaux ( 1987), 
Rolnick and Weber (1988). 
Gorton and Mullineaux 
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(1987) and 
problems. Clearly the arrangement serves as a medium through which 
member banks can lend to temporarily ' illiquid' banks. 
Furthermore, the clearinghouse itself may issue loan certificates 
which banks could borrow and use in place of specie in the 
1 . 29 c earing process . 
Operationality 
As we noted above, the system specified here can be thought 
of simply as a gold commodity standard in which the convertibility 
of currency into gold is undertaken by private, competitive banks 
rather than the Central Bank or Treasury. Price level 
determination in terms of the unit of account occurs via the same 
process that was outlined in section 2.1. above, and White (1984) 
demonstrates that the system specified here is operational 30 • 
Historical experiences in both the U.S. and Scotland support this 
result. 
One issue which should be addressed here, however, is the 
notion of ' ove-r issue' : as Gorton ( 19 8 5) points out, the most 
common criticism of free banking is that private banks in the 
above sys~em would ' overissue' banknotes in the sense that their 
actions would lead to the depreciation of these banknotes {ie. a 
29See Timberlake (1983) and Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) for 
evidence of this 
30White's objective is to "examine generally the operation of a 
free banking system, seeking to discover whether the 
self-interested actions of individual agents in that system give 
rise to equilibrating processes" ( 1984: 278 emphasis added) 
which, in our opinion, he shows to be the case with free banking. 
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higher price level). White (1984) and Dowd (1988), however, 
correctly stress that convertibility imposes a constraint on 
competitive banks to 'overissue' notes in this sense. While 
private banks can costlessly initiate the circulation of their 
notes, either by lending or ' spending' their notes into 
circulation, they cannot costlessly maintain the circulation of 
these notes given their commitment to convertibility of these 
notes into specie. Unless banknotes are willingly accepted and 
held by the public they will be returned to the issuing bank for 
redemption, either by noteholders directly or via the 
clearinghouse arrangement described above, thus draining the 
specie reserves of the issuing bank. 
Pursuing a strategy of deliberately issuing more and more 
notes, then, implies that the issuing bank will exhaust its specie 
reserves, have to borrow reserves from other members of its 
clearinghouse arrangement, and eventually face expulsion from that 
arrangement. Such a strategy is clearly not profitabfe to an 
individual bank in this system. In order to expand its note issue, 
therefore, a private bank must engage in (costly) activity which 
-increases the demand for the notes it . 31 issues U9ing Klein's 
(1974) terminology, a bank must invest in ' brand name capital' in 
order to increase consumer confidence in, and hence the 
acceptability of, its notes. 
This result, that banks 
31This may include, amongst other 
additional branch off ices, more 
services and, as in Klein (1974). 
on banknotes. 
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issuing notes and deposits 
things, longer operating hours, 
extensive advertising of these 
the payment of explicit interest 
convertible on demand into specie cannot ' over issue' these 
liabilities, also holds for the system as whole. If banks jointly 
choose to expand their note issue they would not face adverse 
clearing accounts amongst each other, but rather to banks 
' outside' their region. This occurs because any tendency for 
currency prices to rise in response to this joint expansion is 
countered by outflows of notes and/or specie from the ~egion as 
agents ' import' goods from elsewhere. Thus there is a drain on the 
specie reserves of the system as whole, as agents either directly 
redeem their notes for specie to purchase ' imports' , or banks 
ou tside the region return notes for redemption. 
Conclusion 
A ' free' banking regime in which private, competitive banks 
provide a medium of exchange. convertibile on demand into some 
commodity is operational, as White (1984) has shown. This result 
is not surprising in so far as the system specified here closely 
resembles a commodity standard with a Central Bank (ie. a regime 
i n which a single agency issues convertibile currency) . Proponents 
o f free banking, however, argue that its advantage over a monetary 
s y stem with a Central Bank is the development of ins ti tut ions · 
under free banking which protect the banking system against 
' shocks ' ( such as systemic bank runs) and make it inherently more 
' stable' than it is, and has been, under regulation (see for 
e x ample Dowd 1988a) . This view is countered by theorists who argue 
that ' free' banking systems nonetheless have features which make 
r e gulation and supervision unavoidable if systemic financial 
cr ises are to be averted (see Goodhart 1989). Theory is not yet 
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conclusive on this issue, and it is not clear that ' free' banking 
systems have the property of inhe.tent ' stability' ( ie. the absence 
of systemic financial crises) as claimed by their proponents. This 
suggests that the properties making a free banking system 
preferable over exisiting fiat systems derive from the former 
being a commodity standard regime, rather than a regime without a 
Central Bank . 
. . Under a commodity standard the supply of currency, whether it 
is issued by a Central Bank or competing private banks , is 
u l timately governed by the supply of the monetary commodity. 
Similarly, the price level in both these systems is determined by 
t he supply of and demand for the monetary commodity. Seen from 
this perspective, the price-level properties of a free banking 
regime are essentially the same as those of a commodity standard 
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wi th a Central Bank . The greater ' risk' and ' uncertainty' for 
prices under the gold standard (see Meltzer 1986), as well as the 
r esource costs associated with a commodity standard, suggest that 
the regime described in this section does not have any properties 
making it preferable over a ' managed' fiat standard. 
We turn now to the final proposal that is a derivative of a 
commodity standard. Although it is a ' free' banking regime, it 
a l so encompasses features of the variable commodity standard 
d i scussed in section 2 . 2 . of this chapter, and is claimed to 
a chieve a stable price-level as we l l as eliminate ' monetary 
di sequilibrium'. 
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As Hall (1982a:1553)) notes, " [U]nder a gold standard 
deregulation would affect the price level only to the extent that 
i t changed the supply of or demand for gold". 
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2.4. The BFH System 
Introduction 
This section examines a proposal, put forward by Greenfield 
and Yeager (1983, 1989; hereafter G&Y) 33 , which may be summarised 
as a combination of the free banking system and the variable 
commodity standard ( s) described above. Called the BFH 34 system 
G&Y' s proposal stems f ram their concern with two inter-related 
aspects of (past and) present monetary regimes. The first is that 
"our existing monetary system is absurd in having a unit of 
account whose size ( purchasing power·) is the supply and demand 
determined value of a fiat medium of exchange" (1989:6). Economic 
calculation and coordination are clearly impaired by the presence 
of such an 'unstable' unit of account. The second, and related, 
' absurdity' concerns the manner in which the supply and demand for 
the medium of exchange interact in adjusting its value. In 
particular, "since monetary disequilibrium cannot be · corrected by 
a straightforward adjustment of a single price ... its correction 
requires adjusting myriads of seperate but interdependent prices 
on myriads of seperate markets" (1989:6). 
The solution to these problems, according to G&Y, lies in 
' separating' the unit of account from the medium of exchange, 
where ' separation' means "that the unit [of account] is defined 
independently of any particular medium of exchange. Various media 
hitch onto the unit" (1989:18). The BFH system, then, represents 
33 See also Yeager (1983, 1985 and 1989). 
3 4After ideas taken from Black (1970), Fama (1980) and Hall (1982). 
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a monetary system which presumably achieves this ' separation', and 
purportedly has the following properties: 
(i) it would be rendered operational by banks' natural 
adoption of 'indirect convertibility' (see below), and 
(ii) it would eliminate the above problems from a monetary 
economy. 
We show, however, that the BFH system as specified by G&Y is 
non-operational and, further, that the assumptions necessary to 
satisfy ( i) in fact preclude the satisfaction of (ii). In other 
words, if the BFH system is operational it has no properties which 
make it superior either to a conventional corn.modi ty standard or 
existing fiat standards. 
Description 
Let us ignore any transitional problems and assume that the 
BFH system is in operation. The government has defined a unit of 
account (which G&Y call the Unit) in terms of a specified bundle 
of commodities (which we denote as b) , and this Unit is routinely 
used by agents to quote prices. The government does not designate 
anything as legal tender and does not issue currency denominated 
in Units. 
Private banks issue distinguishable bank notes denominated in 
Uni ts as wel 1 as deposits convertible into these notes, and we 
assume that these are the sole media of exchange in our economy. 
According to G&Y, these BFH banks naturally choose to uphold the 
exchange value of their notes and deposits via ' indirect 
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convertibility' 35 • This means that banks stand ready to redeem each 
Unit of their notes and deposits into some redemption medium 
(which, without loss of generality, we assume is gold and denote 
here as g) in an amount whose exchang e value at existing market 
prices is equal to that of the standard bundle, b, of commodities. 
This amount of gold "would be calculated each month (day) from the 
open-market price of gold and from the prices of the various goods 
in the bundle" (Yeager 1983:323 , emphasis added) 36 • Notice that the 
amount of gold banks are prepared to redee~ for their notes and 
deposits represents a gold price and thus that there are, in 
effect, two prices for gold in terms of Unit currency. G&Y's 
specification implies that banks ' derive ' their gold price in 
terms of Unit currency, PB gu, from the market price of gold in 
terms of Unit currency, P:u' via the rule: 
PM 
PB 
gu 
= ( 3) gu 
pbu 
wh ere = P . I U 
i E b 
a n d where the bundle (for simplicity) consists of one unit of each 
35While there are reasons why so-called free banks may be compelled 
t o offer par convertibility, there is no apparent reason why 
competitive banks would naturally adopt a convertibility rule such 
a s the one outlined below. 
36 Since Unit-denominated notes and deposits are the only media of 
e x change, the "prices" referred to here must be Unit prices . 
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good i E b, bis the set of goods included in the standard bundle, 
and P . denotes the price (per unit) of the goods i E b expressed 
lU 
. U . 37 1.n n1. ts . 
Before turning to the operationality of this system, we 
should note an apparent inconsistency in the way G&Y think that 
the value of the Unit will be maintained. According to an earlier 
paper, the commodity bundle "would, by definition, have the fixed 
price of 1 Unit" (1983:303, emphasis added). · In terms of our 
description above, this implies that the Unit-price of the 
standard bundle, Phu' would take on a value of one Unit ' by 
definition'. This is inconsistent with G&Y's later acknowledgement 
that "the total price of the BFH commodity bundle [can] 
deviate from the one corresponding to the definition of the Unit" 
(1989:13 ). 
The presence of indirect convertibility in G&Y's system 
provides the means whereby the Unit's value is supposed to return 
to its ' definition' in the event of such a deviation. Clearly if 
the price of the standard bundle is one Unit ' by definition', 
there is no need to invoke any convertibility rule in order to 
uphold this price. Let us assume then that definition alone is not 
sufficient to ~aintain the Unit's value, and evaluate the indirect · 
conver tibility process. 
' 
37Gr eenfield, in correspondence, has pointed out a dimensionality 
problem with equation (3). Clearly there are two prices for gold 
in terms of Units, with one being ' derived' from the other - hence 
the problem. Of course, this is G&Y's specification, not ours. 
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Operationality 
Our procedure for analysis will be to allow non-zero excess 
demand to arise for some good i E b (which implies that the Unit 
price of the bundle deviates from one) and then to consider 
whether the BFH banks' automatic reaction by equation (3) above . 
will maintain the Unit's value. Yeager (in correspondence) 
contends that this analytical procedure ignores the distinction 
between banks (plural) and the individual bank in the BFH system, 
and posits that indirect convertibility should be seen primarily 
as a rule disciplining individual banks. He argues that a bank 
which ' over issues' notes ( and deposits) wi 11 drive the price of 
the Unit-defining bundle above one in terms of its own notes. The 
prices of gold and the commodities in the bundle would be measured 
in Uni ts, but this is equivalent to "measuring them in 
Unit-denominated banknotes of banks that were maintaining their 
issues at their full denominated values". Indirect convertibility, 
then, serves to impose a ' penalty' on the over-issuing bank, since 
it now has to redeem its notes and deposits for more gold than all 
other BFH banks (ie. only the ' misbehaving' bank lowers its gold 
price in terms Units). Given that individual banks face this 
penalty for ' over issue', Yeager claims that they avoid doing so 
and thus "for the system as whole, the question is forestalled of 
what happens if prices generally rise out of correspondence 
with the bundle definition of the Unit". 
Yeager's argument, however, is problematic. As we have noted 
in section 2.3. above, banks cannot ' overissue' liabilities which 
they promise to redeem for · gold. Convertibility itself is the 
constraint on overissue, since any banknotes which are not 
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willingly held by the public are returned3 8 to the issuing bank for 
redemption into gold, and thus that bank will find itself losing 
reserves of the redemption medium. The fact that they offer 
convertibility implies that BFH banks would not be able to drive 
up the price of the Unit-defining bundle in terms of their own 
notes. There is, however, a more compelling reason as to why this 
would not occur in the BFH system. Sellers who were faced with 
positive excess demand ( for whatever ·reason) for their goods would 
raise the Unit prices of these goods: that is, they would ask for 
more notes or deposits in exchange for their goods irrespective of 
the issuing bank. Given that banknotes and deposits are all 
denominated in Units, and are convertible into gold according to 
the same rule, there is simply no basis for agents to accept them 
at anything other than their denominated value, or for sellers to 
charge different prices for the goods they sell according to which 
banks' currency is tendered. The possibility that the price of the 
Unit-defining bundle differs across currencies thus never arises 
in the BFH system as specified by G&Y. Yeager's emphasis -on the 
distinction between banks and the individual bank is therefore 
superfluous, since any disturbance to price of the Unit-defining 
bundle implies that all banks respond in the way implied by 
equation (3) above. Our procedure for analysing the operationality 
of the BFH system is clearly consistent with this result. 
Recall, then, that G&Y claim that indirect convertibility via 
the rule specified by ( 3) provides a mechanism whereby some ( or 
3BE. h . . it er via direct redemption or, if agents deposit the notes with 
other banks, via the clearing process. 
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all) Piu' i Eb, will adjust to restore Pbu to its ' definitional' 
price of 1 Unit whenever it deviates from this price. Such a 
deviation would occur whenever non-zero excess demand arises for 
some good i Eb. 
When P bu differs from 1, equation ( 3) indicates that the 
banks' price 'for gold will differ from the market price, and an 
oppurtunity for arbitrage is created. For instance, Pbu > 1 
implies that P8 gu and agents can ' round-trip' by redeeming 
notes for gold and selling this gold in the market, driving the 
market gold price down. A falling market price for gold implies, 
by equation (3), that the banks' price of gold must move in the 
same direction, as an increasing amount of gold is now needed to 
' purchase' the standard bundle. 
According to G&Y, "to engage in such arbitrage, people would 
try to obtain notes and deposits for redemption by exhibiting 
reduced eagerness to buy goods and services and increased 
eagerness to sell them, all of which would put appropriate 
downward pre·ssure on the general price level and on the total 
price of the standard bundle" (1989:14). 
This is surely incorrect. This riskless arbitrage opportunity 
does not imply increased demand for notes and deposits for 
redemption purposes. Agents would simply buy gold from the banks 
(redeem notes) and simultaneously sell gold in the market to 
realise a gain, and would not require ' additional' notes and 
deposits for such transactions. More importantly, there is nothing 
in this arbitrage process which implies negative excess demands 
for goods in general, including those in the Unit-defining 
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3 9 bund l e . Consequently, there is no mechanism for inducing the 
required (downward) changes in the Un it prices of the goods 
comprising the standard bundle in order to restore the definition 
of the Unit . This arbitrage process thus drives both the market 
and banks' gold price to zero, or terminates when the banks renege 
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on their rule due to insufficient gold reserves . 
The upshot is that unless G&Y can specify why the arbitrage 
p r ocess should induce the necessary ad j ustment in the Unit prices 
of the goods comprising the standard bundle when P bu -t 1, their 
rule for indirect convertibility renders the BFH system 
n on-operational. The major cause of trouble in G&Y's proposal 
ar i ses from there being two prices for gold (the redemption 
medium) in terms of Unit currency. Clearly gold or redemption 
media in general cannot have a market price in terms of Unit 
currency which is independent from that specified by BFH banks. 
Unfortunately, this feature is central to G&Y' s specification of 
the BFH system and its supposed ' seperation' of the unit of 
account from the medium of exchange . 
With different assumptions, however , it is possible to 
describe a variant of the BFH s y stem which . avoids the 
operationality problem above, and it is to the description of this 
s y stem that we now turn . 
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I f anything , we can expect positive e x cess demands for goods , and 
t hu s r ising prices , since agents clearly profit from such 
a rbitrage and so increase their wealth. 
4 0 I f p < 1 h . b u , t e arbitrage process implies that both gold prices 
rise to infinity . 
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A BFH Variant 
Assume now that gold exists alongside Unit banknotes and 
deposits as a generally accepted medium of exchange. Thus the 
exchanges which are routinely occuring are bilateral sales or 
purchases of goods for either gold or Unit notes and deposits, and 
agents quote both a gold price (expressed in ounces) as well as a 
Unit price for their goods. This then enables BFH banks to observe 
market prices of the goods in the Unit-defining bundle in terms of 
gold, and to op~rate under the modified rule: 
PB 
gu = 
1 
E b 
( 4) 
P . 1g 
where P . denotes the market price of good i in terms of ounces of 
lg 
gold and P8 denotes the banks' price for an ounce of gold in gu 
terms of Unit currency. Comparison with equation (3) above shows 
that this rule, if it can be adhered to, would maintain P = 1. bu 
Notice that this rule, in contrast to (3), assumes that there is 
no independent market gold-for-Unit price PM ; in other words, and gu 
more plausibly, market agents are price takers of the ·banks' 
determined value PB 41 • gu 
Operationality 
Our procedure for analysis, as before, is to consider how 
41 The Unit price of gold, PB can be considered as 'market gu, 
determined' only in the sense that banks derive this magnitude by 
observing the amount of gold necessary to buy the Unit-defining 
bundle at market prices (expressed in ounces of gold). 
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agents set about changing prices when non-zero excess demand 
a r ises which requires price changes (i) in the market for a good 
which is included in the Unit-defining bundle, and (ii) in the 
market for the redemption medium, which i n this case is gold. 
(i) Non-Zero Excess Demand For Some Good i E b 
Suppose that a supply failure causes a positive excess demand 
for some good i E b to occur, whilst other markets remain 
un disturbed. Given the prevailing P8 , the response of agents in g u 
this market must be to raise the price of i relative to both 
Unit-denominated currency and gold, ie . to the new prices 
P ' = a P and P'. = a P . , where a > 1 4 2 • Since i E b, equation 
iu i u 19 19 
( 4 ) implies that banks now respond by reducing PB gu to its new 
va l ue corresponding to P '. . This implies in turn that agents in 
1 g 
all markets j, including market i, must now either raise P . or 
J g 
l ower P . or perform some combination of these two actions in 
J U 
order to realign their prices with the new value of PB . If agents g u 
react by only raising P . the system is obviously not operational 
Jg 
sin ce this will only cause further reductions in PB . gu Hence we 
must assume that some agents for the goods j E b make some of the 
th P B by e new g u a dj ustment reducing their respective Unit to 
p ri ces, P . JU This would ensure eventual convergence of Unit price~ 
ba ck to the condition P bu = 1. 
For this process to work it is therefore necessary , firstly, 
t ha t market prices P . for goods in terms of gold are observable 
1 g 
a nd, secondly, that agents make at least some of the adjustment to 
4 2 Thi' s . . . 1 · price rise imp ies that good i has also become more 
expensive against all other goods. 
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changes in PB by appropriate changes in P . rather than P . . Both 
gu lU 19 
of these conditions rely on the continuing presence of gold (the 
redemption medium) as a generally accepted medium of exchange. If 
Unit-denominated notes and deposits are the sole medium of 
exchange, BFH banks must make their calculations of PB from gu 
observations of P and PM b i u gu Y equation ( 3) above which, as we 
have shown, leaves the system non-operational. Furthermore, if 
Unit-deno~inated notes and deposits are the only medium of 
exchange, there is no reason why agents in markets for goods other 
than gold should be influenced in their choices of the Unit prices 
they post by changes in PB. 
, gu 
(ii) Non-Zero Excess Demand for Gold (The Redemption Medium) 
We have shown that our variant of the BFH system is 
operational only if gold cont i nues to exist in parallel with 
Unit-denominated notes and deposits as a medium of exchange. The 
determination of the prices of goods in terms of gold clearly 
occurs in the same way as under the commodity standard described 
in section 2.1. above. As outlined there an excess supply of gold 
implies positive excess demands for goods, which in turn results 
in the prices of goods in terms of gold rising and gold becoming 
cheaper relative to goods. To use G&Y's terminology, ' monetary 
disequilibrium' cannot, in this case, be corrected by adjusting a 
single price in a single market, but only by a general adjustment 
in all prices. 
Under our variant of the BFH system, then, an excess supply 
of gold implies a general increase in the gold and Unit prices of 
commodities given the existing PB. This would then induce changes 
gu 
1. n P 8 d an , gu via the process described above, induce . the 
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appropriate changes in the Unit prices of commodites such that 
P = 1 again. The relevant point here is that non-zero excess 
bu 
demands for gold cannot be eliminated via the adjustment only of a 
single price, PB gu since agents in the gold market are price 
takers with respect to the Unit-currency price of gold. Gold can 
only become cheaper relative to Unit-currency by first becoming 
cheaper relative to goods in general; that is, via the 'roundabout 
and sluggish' adjustment in prices which G&Y are trying to avoid 
with their proposal. 
Conclusion 
The motivation for the BFH proposal is that it eliminates 
certain problems from a monetary economy, which is to be achieved 
via ' seperation' of the unit of account from the medium of 
exchange; in other words, defining the unit of account in terms of 
a bundle of commodities. This system is supposedly rendered 
operational by the ' indirect convertibility' of competively issued 
currency into some redemption medium like gold. 
It was found, however, that unless this redemption medium 
itself is a routinely used medium of exchange, such a system is 
not operational. A BFH system therefore can -- at best -- only 
coexist with a conventional monetary system whose unit of account 
and medium of exchange are not seperated (such as a conventional 
commodity or fiat standard) and even then it cannot avoid the 
' painful monetary disequilibrium' motivating this alternative 
system. 
This concludes our consideration of proposals for alternative 
monetary regimes that are derivatives of a commodity standard. We 
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turn our attention, in the following chapters, to alternative 
monetary regimes which propose deregul ation of the financial 
system but do not feature the convertibile currencies associated 
with a commodity standard. 
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3. Competitive Fiduciary Currencies 
Introduction 
The 43 common argument against competition among private 
issuers of fiduciary currencies has been that such an arrangement 
would eventually degenerate into a paper standard' without any 
finite price level, since as long as a competitively issued 
fiduciary currency has an exchange value exceeding its cost of 
production an individual issuer has an incentive to issue 
additional amounts. Klein (1974) was the first to point out that 
this argument proceeded on the assumption that currency issuers 
were competing in the production of an indistinguishable, 
homogenous 44 product . The conclusion above, therefore, did not 
derive from any ' special' characteristic of fiduciary currency but 
from the fact that indistingui~hability of the output of competing 
firms would lead to product quality depreciation in any industry45 • 
Stated differently, the contention that competitive 
equilibrium in the fiduciary currency industry implies an infinite 
price level assumes that the competing currencies are convertible 
into each other by issuers at unchanging fixed exchange rates. 
Competition · would lead each issuer to inflate at a higher rate . 
4 3 -See for example Friedman (1959) or Pesek and Saving (1967). 
44 
Note that Thompson (1974) also points out this result in 
connection with competitive fiduciary currencies, albeit in a 
different context. Indistinguishabili ty, he argues, violates the 
private property condition of orthodox value theory. 
4 5 Competing firms have incentives to depreciate the quality of an 
indistinguishable product since the costs of such actions will be 
borne mainly by other firms in the industry (see Klein 1974:430). 
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than other firms, implying the standard result that ' bad monies 
drive out good monies'. Klein arg~ed that distinguishable, ' brand 
name' currencies were necessary for the competitive provision of 
fiduciary currency and, if these exchanged with one another at 
market determined flexible exchange rates, currency issuers would 
not act so as to depreciate these currencies. Briefly, competitive 
currency issuers would invest in brand name capital (ie. increase 
the, confidence in, and acceptability of, their currency) by 
succesfully keeping the rate of currency issue equal to the rate 
anticipated by the public. In such a scenario, 'high confidence' 
currencies would drive out ' low confidence' currencies. 
Klein's (1974) paper, however, does not argue that a 
competitive currency regime has properties which make it 
preferable over ' managed' fiat regimes, but is concerned rather 
with elaborating the theoretical properties of such a regime 
consistent with the assumption that competitively issued 
currencies are distinguishable. Klein notes that historical 
examples of such regimes are extremely rare, and rationalises the 
(monopoly) role of government in the provision of currency. The 
proposal for competing fiduciary currencies as an alternative 
monetary regime is thus attributed to Hayek (1978, 1984), whq 
argues that "[T]he past instability of the market economy is the 
consequence of the exclusion of the most 
the market mechanism, money, from itself 
market process" (1978:98). Hayek proposes, 
altogether with the monopoly of government 
private enterprise to supply the public 
exchange it may prefer" (1978:22). 
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important regulator of 
being regulated by the 
therefore, to "do away 
... money and to allow 
with other media of 
Hayek' s specification of the banking institutions supplying 
these media of exchange has been criticised as being "remarkably 
vague" (Fischer, 1986:433). As we outline below, banks can 
implicitly adopt two distinct operating procedures for maintaining 
the purchasing power of the currencies they issue. Although both 
of these operating procedures are consistent with the 
operationality of a competitive fiduciary currency system, one is 
found to be implausible under this regime. The argument that such 
a regime is preferable over existing regimes, however, must turn 
on the prior belief that competitive outcomes are necessarily 
superior to those obtaining in a regula.ted but ' well managed' 
monetary system. 
Specification 
Let us assume, to begin with, an economy with a monetary 
regime corresponding to the fiat standards we currently observe. 
The role of a Central Bank is to issue fiat currency by standing 
ready to lend it to the banking system at some nominal interest 
rate (which is set by the Bank at a level it presumes is 
consistent with its monetary policy objectives). Fiat currency, as 
well as bank deposits convertible on demand into fiat currency, 
are the routinely used media of exchange, and all prices and 
contracts are expressed in this currency. Let us name this fiat 
currency (and hence also the unit of account) the dollar. 
Assume now that all regulations relating to the currency 
monopoly of the Central Bank are removed. Although it continues to 
issue r dollar currency as before, the Central Bank has become an 
issuer of fiduciary rather than fiat currency. Since there a~e no 
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longer any ' special' legal restrictions distinguishing banks from 
any other firms, and agents are free to use any currency for 
expressing prices and contracts, some private banks will want to 
issue their own distinguishable currencies, and agents who believe 
such currencies will provide a stable unit of account or store of 
value (say) will adopt them for these purposes. • 
Al though seemingly unaware of the fact, Hayek proposes two 
distinct procedures whereby private banks would initiate and 
maintain the circulation of their (uniquely denominated) notes and 
deposits, and we specify each in turn. We differentiate the 
procedures by naming the currency as ' ducats' (Hayek 1978), in the 
first case, and as ' solids' (Hayek 1984) in the second. As is 
explained below, the ' ducat' issuer's operating procedures are 
essentially the same as that of any existing Central Bank, whilst 
the ' solid' issuer is essentially a BFH bank as already analysed 
in section 2.4. above. 
According to Hayek ( 1978), a bank wishing to issue ducat 
denominated notes ( and deposits 46 ) could do so either by 1 ending 
them at some nominal (ducat) interest rate, or by standing reaqy 
to exchange them, now and in the future, for some minimum price in 
terms of dollars. This minimum would be intended "only as a floor 
below which the value of the [ducat) could not fall because [the 
bank) would announce at the same time [its) intention to regulate 
the quantity of ducats so as to keep their ... purchasing power as 
nearly as possible constant" (Hayek, 1978:42). The sale of 
4 6 Note that these are now irrevocable claims to ducat currency 
only. 
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currency would thus be the chief form o f initial issue but, after 
a regular market in that currency i s established, it would be 
issued predominantly by lending at int ere st . In order to alter the 
volume of its notes and deposits (and hence their purchasing 
power) the ducat issuing bank must c h a nge the interest rate it 
charges for loans (and offers on depos it s), in the same way as is 
. . 1 B k 47 done by existing Centra ans . 
An alternative operating procedur e for a new currency issuer, 
whose currency unit we shall call the ' solid', can also be found 
in Hayek (1978, 1984). Such a bank would issue its liabilities 
either by lending them at some chosen n ominal interest rate, or by 
s t anding ready to redeem solids "in such amounts of other 
cu rrencies as would be required at any time to buy the whole 
c o llection of different raw materials defining [the solid]" 
(Hayek, 1984:328; emphasis added). The latter rule implies that 
the issuing bank must "stand ready to buy and sell at the stated 
rates any amount of such units [ie. solids] that might be offered 
to or demanded of it" (Hayek, 1984:331) , and thus the bank sets 
t h e exchange rate (now and in the futu r e ) between solids and 
d o llars . This description also indicates that the s .olid-issuing 
ban k i s formally identical to a BFH bank in o u r variant of the BFH 
s y stem developed in section 2. 4. above: al though the redemption 
medium in this case is dollar currency rather than gold, the rule 
wh ereby the solid-issuing bank maintains the purchasing power of 
47Given the institutional arrangements under existing fiat 
s t andards, Bank rate is the only policy instrument at the disposal 
of Central Banks ( see Whittaker and Theunissen 1987 or Moore 
19 89 ). 
54 
its currency is clearly the same as that of a BFH bank. 
The difference between these two ' types' of banks, then, can 
be summarised as follows. Private banks operating in the manner of 
the ducat-issuing bank maintain the exchange value of their 
currencies via adjustment of the interest rates at which they are 
prepared to lend these currencies, and must accept the market 
determined exchange rates of their currencies against the dollar 
that are consistent with this lending rate. Banks operating in the 
manner of the solid-issuing bank, however, maintain the exchange 
value of their currencies by standing ready to exchange them for 
sufficient dollars to buy some commodity bundle; that is, by 
' pegging' the dollar exchange rate of their currencies at a level 
dictated by a BFH-like rule. Given this exchange rate, and the 
nominal interest rate set by the (ex) Central Bank, these banks 
are forced to set the nominal - interest rates on their loans (and 
deposits) at levels consistent with interest parity if they wish 
to avoid either accumulating or losing dollar currency reserves. 
In the discussion that follows we will assume, without loss 
of generality, that there are only three banks competing in the 
production of fiduciary currencies, namely the old Centra~ Bank, 
which issues dollars, a ducat-issuer and a solid-issuer. · 
Considering that the costs of computing conversion values, as well 
1 
as the costs of detecting counterfeit notes, increase with the 
number of currency ' brands' in circulation, we would in any case 
not expect a proliferation of such brands. 
Operationality 
In the system described above, the existing medium of 
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exchange and unit 
exists for either 
of account is the dollar. The potential now 
the ducat or ·the solid (or both} to coexist 
with, or ultimately replace the dollar in both of these roles, and 
we examine each of these possibilities in turn. 
As specified above, the ducat-issuer operates just like the · 
dollar-issuing bank, and there is a flexible, market-determined 
exchange rate between these two currencies. Al though these two 
banks are actively competing in this case, such a scenario 
reproduces (on a national scale} the institutional arrangements we 
currently observe between two Central Banks on an international 
scale. Only by successfully maintaining the stability and 
predictability of the purchasing power of their currencies, 
however, can these banks now increase the ' confidence' agents have 
in their currencies and thereby increase the acceptability and 
circulation of their currencies. The incentives ( in the form of 
seigniorage rents} to maintain and increase the circulation of 
their currencies by ' successful' performance imply that a 
competitive currency regime where banks operate like ducat (or 
dollar) issuers would indeed be operational . This is not to say 
t h at every bank operating under this regime will act in the 
interest of its note and deposit holders : clearly some banks maY. 
renege on their contractual obligations and price-level policies 
in pursuit of short-term gains. 
Turning now to the solid-issuing bank, re c all that it 
r esembles a BFH bank under our variant of the BFH system in 
se c tion 2.4 . above. Although the redemption medium in this case is 
d o llar currency , section 2.4 .· shows that a system characterised by 
s u ch banks could be operationa l . Our analysis in that section 
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indicates however that a solid-issuing bank could never, via 
competitive means, displace the dollar-issuing bank, since the 
rule whereby the solid-issuer maintains the purchasing power of 
its monetary unit presupposes that it can observe the dollar 
prices of the commodity bundle defining that unit . Hayek's (1978) 
contention, therefore, that his proposal entails "a displacement 
of the national circulations [ie. the dollar in this case] if 
the national monetary authorities misbehaved" (1978:21) is 
incorrect. No matter how badly the dollar-issuing bank 
' misbehaves' (ie. depreciates its currency), the solid cannot 
displace the dollar from its role of ·unit of account if the 
solid-issuing bank is to maintain its convertibility rule ( ie. 
maintain a determinate exchange rate between solids and dollars) 48 . 
By adopting this convertibility rule the solid-issuing bank 
effectively constrains its ability to compete with other banks and 
would be unable, ultimately, to capture a significant proportion 
of the currency ' market'. Thus although a competitive fiduciary 
currency regime characterised by banks operating like the 
solid-issuing bank would be operational, we would not expect such 
a system to emerge upon deregulation of existing monetary systems. 
Conclusion. 
Klein (1974) has provided theoretical grounds for the result 
that a competitive fiduciary currency regime does not imply 
4 8 Note that the solid-issuing bank would be forced to alter its 
operating procedure if the ducat displaced the dollar as the 
routinely used unit of account, and that this is likely to occur 
precisely when the dollar-issuing bank misbehaves. 
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infinite (or indeterminate) price levels. Hayek (1978, 1984) 
proposes such a regime on the grounds that fiduciary currency, 
which is accepted 11 only because people trust the issuer to keep it 
stable 11 (1978:107), is preferable over fiat currency, which 
11 people have been forced to accept 11 ( 1978: 107) and which has a 
history of ti inflation engineered by government ti ( 1978: 29) . Parts 
of Hayek's specification of such a system, however, were found to 
be implausible. This suggests that an operational regime of the 
kind proposed by Hayek would be characterised by distinguishable 
currencies: 
(i) exchanging at flexible, market determined exchange rates, and 
(ii) issued by banks who regulate the quantity of their notes and 
deposits in circulation by adjusting the nominal interest 
rates they charge for loans of their currency and offer on 
deposits of their currency. 
· Notice, however, that displacement of the existing national 
currency occurs only if the (ex) Central Bank does not maintain 
the stability and predictability of that currency's 
power. Agents will only be willing to accept a ' new' 
purchasing 
fiduciary 
currency if they have incentives to do so and, 
Klein (1976) and Friedman and Schwartz (1986 ) , 
in the opinion of 
these incentives 
may have to 
unpredictable 
be quite 
inflation 
substantial 
rate in 
(ie. 
the 
a very unstable and 
national currency). 
Nonetheless, it remains true of the proposed regime that there are 
no longer any barriers to entry in the currency industry, and thus 
t h at agents are able to adopt al terna ti ve fiduciary currencies 
whenever they perceive the behaviour of the monetary authorities 
t o be undesirable. The threat of competition, therefore, will act 
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to constrain and influence the decisions and behaviour of the 
monetary authorities in a more dir ect way than a monetary 
'constitution'. 
Ultimately, however, a preference f o r a competitive fiduciary 
currency regime over existing fiat regimes must derive from the 
(questionable) notion that one cannot ensure that the monetary 
authorities strictly pursue a stable price-level policy. To argue, 
as Hayek does, that his proposal will "eliminate all the causes of 
the alternation of inflationary booms and periods of depression 
which have plagued mankind ever since deliberate attempts at a 
central control of money have been made" (quoted in Fischer, 
1986:434), is simply an unjustifiable conjecture. 
We turn now a proposed payments system that is also 
characterised by competitive, unregulated financial intermediaries 
but, rather than issuing currency , these banks provide access to 
an accounting system of exchange. 
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4. Accounting Systems of Exchange 
Introduction 
This section examines the operationality of a payments system 
in which exchanges routinely occur via an accounting system of 
exchange provided by competitive, unregulated banks. Such a 
payments system, which was first forwarded by Black (1970), has 
subsequently been described in detail by Fama ( 1·980, 1983) and has 
been incorporated as a feature of . various recent proposals for 
49 
monetary reform . Al though there are unit of account prices in 
Black's (1970) proposed system, no medium of account is defined 
and there is no indication of how unit of account prices are 
determined. Fama (1980) specifies a real good (namely barrels of 
oil) as the medium of account and, as his specification 
incorporates the major f ea tur:es of Black ( 19 7 0) , we therefore 
examine the operationality of an accounting system as described by 
him. Note that Fama's objective is to illustrate the notion that 
financial intermediaries play no special role in the determination 
of the price level, and he pays no attention to the 
operationality of an accounting system. Fama seeks to show that, 
in principfe, there can exist payments systems in which price · 
level control is not dependent on the regulation of financial 
intermediaries. 
As before, our method of analysis will be to examine whether 
the accounting system, as specified by Fama (1980), can be 
4 9 . See White (1984b) and Cowen and Kroszner 
this literature. We are not aware that 
analysis as a proposal for monetary reform. 
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( 1987) for reviews of 
Fama intends his own 
sustained over time in an economy with market pricing. It is found 
that the medium of account must .be tradeable directly (that is, 
outside the accounting system) against at least one asset in the 
asset market underlying the accounting system for such a system to 
be operational. If the medium of accoDnt is itself an accounting . 
entry that functions as a medium of exchange, however, all 
payments can be made via an accounting system of exchange. Since 
suco a medium of account could conceivably be provided by Central 
Banks in an unregulated payments system, we describe such a regime 
and find it to be operational. This substantiates Fama's result 
that unregulated payments systems may exist in which Central Banks 
nonetheless have control over the price level. 
4.1. An Accounting System Without A Central Bank 
Description 
Let us assume, to begin with, a world in which financial 
intermediation is unregulated, and that neither a Central Bank nor 
any hand-to-hand medium of exchange has survived the transition to 
this world. Exchanges routinely occur via an accounting system of 
exchange provided by financial intermediaries. We assume further 
that the numeraire, or medium of account, is oil, and that all 
prices are quoted in terms of 'standard' barrels of oil. 
According to Fischer (1982), "there is nothing in most 
monetary analyses that determines the choice of numeraire 11 
(1982:8), and this is indeed true of Fama's analysis. As oil is 
neither a medium of exchange nor legal tender in his scenario, 
there are no compelling reasons why agents should quote prices in 
terms of oil rather than any other good in the economy. Contrary 
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to monetary history, then, which suggests that agents typically 
quoted prices in terms of the medium o f exchange, choice of the 
numeraire in the accounting system envisaged by Fama is 
essentially arbitrary, and it is simply assumed that some good in 
the economy performs (and will continue to perform) this function. 
Fama's spaceship parable (1980 : 55-56 ), in which the government 
decides to replace the existing unit of account ( steel ingots) 
with an abstract unit of account called the "Unit", is subject to 
a similar problem. As McCallum (1985) has pointed out, creating a 
demand for "Units" by regulation is not a sufficient condition to 
ensure that they become the economy's unit of account. There is no 
reason why steel (in Fama's parable) should not remain the medium 
o f account. 
According to Fama (1980), competitive ' banks' in this 
s c enario provide two major services. Firstly, they manage 
portfolios for agents; that is, they take ' wealth' provided by 
' depositors' and use it to purchase marketable securities and 
loans held on behalf of depositors. Secondly, they provide an 
accounting system for exchanging claims against weal th among 
depositors. For both of these services, banks charge competitive 
f e es . 
For purposes of definition , therefore , we may consider Fama's 
' banks' to be checkable mutual funds and ' deposits' to be shares 
(o r ownership units) in the underlying asset portfolios of these 
funds . Notice that banks do not stand ready to convert deposits 
. . h 50 int o e1t er currenc y or barrels of o i l , and further that deposits 
50, D . 
epos1t ' is thus a rather inappropriate term, s i nce there is in 
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have a value (expressed in barrels of oil) which fluctuates as the 
market value of the portfolio of which they are a share 
51 fluctuates . The solvency of these ' banks' (checkable mutual 
.funds) is always assured since the value of their liabilities 
falls with the value of their assets. Financial intermediation in 
this payments system thus avoids the possibility of bank failures 
due to 'runs' on banks, a problem which has historically 
characterised the ' free' banking systems discussed in section 2.3. 
above and which persists under existing fiat · standards (see Kin~ 
1983 and Goodhart 1989). 
Financial securities in this accounting system are not 
materially different to those in current asset markets. Common 
stocks (ordinary shares) denote ownership of firms, can pay 
dividends via the accounting system, and have a market determined 
price in terms of oil (see below). Bonds may be claims to deposits 
· denominated in barrels of oil. As Keynes has noted, "it is of the 
essence of a deb"t to be enforceable in terms of something other 
than itself'.' (1930:6), thus we take it for granted that the 
' circularity' problem pointed out by White (1984b, 1986) and 
Hoover (1988) does not arise in the accounting system described 
here. 
Any transaction requiring a transfer of wealth between agents 
would occur via the accounting system provided by banks. A 
purchase of goods would be accomplished, in the normal way, by the 
fact no element of convertibility involved. We use the term only 
because Fama uses it. 
51
The asset market is discussed more fully below. 
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buyer writing a check on his . 52 deposit . The buyer's bank thus 
debits the buyer's deposit, while the seller's bank credits the 
seller's deposit, for the amount of the transaction. If both 
agents are with the same bank, this transaction would, according 
to our definitions above, simply amoun t to a transfer of ownership 
of a portion of its underlying asset portfolio from the buyer to 
the seller. If the agents are with different banks, the debit to 
the sending account generates a sale of securities from the 
portfolio of which the sending deposit or has a share, while the 
credit to the receiving account generates a purchase of securities 
for the portfolio of which the receiving depositor has a share. 
Finally, Fama remarks that "an accounting system for 
completing transactions does away with the need for a physical 
medium of exchange to settle transactions" (1983:10, emphasis 
added). While this is indeed the case, it should be clear that 
bank deposits, even though they are intangible accounting entries, 
are the medium of exchange since they are routinely acEepted in 
exchange for goods and services . Although it is correct to 
consider an accounting system of e xchange as a ' cashless' payments 
system, it is incorrect to infer f ram this that there is no 
medium of exchange or that an accounting system does away with the 
need for a medium of exchange altogether. 
Operationality 
The above description specifies an accounting system, as 
52Clearly one can envisage other means of accessing the accounting 
system , ie. via an electronic signal rather than a paper check. 
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envisaged by Fama (1980, 1983), whose unit of account is ' a barrel 
of oil', and whose medium of exchange is accounting entries 
denoting barrel-of-oil denominated bank deposits. This means that 
agents post prices for the goods they trade in terms of barrels of 
oil, since that is the denomination of the payment they routinely 
expect to receive. An agent's response to non-zero excess demand 
for his good is then an adjustment in the barrel of oil price of 
the good. There is, however, a difficulty with this response in 
the oil market itself. 
Unlike all other agents in the economy, oil sellers cannot, 
via the accounting system, change the barrel of oil price of their 
output when facing (say) an excess demand for oil. It is clearly 
inconsistent for oil sellers to post a price of more than ' one 
barrel of oil' for a barrel of oil: this would mean that they were 
asking for more than ' one barrel of oil worth' of securities in 
exchange for a barrel of oil, and would imply that the unit of 
account no longer bore any specific, or operationally meaningful, 
relation to a barrel of oil. In short, the specification of the 
system above violates one of Patinkin' s ( 1961) necessary 
conditions for rendering a monetary system determinate, since 
non-zero excess demands for oil (the medium of account) imply that 
it would not be sold "at face value stated in terms of the unit of 
account" (Fama, 1983:17). Considering that oil is the numeraire, 
excess demands for oil require, instead, that the oil price of the 
assets being traded for oil via the accounting system fall. There 
is, however, no way this can be brought about when oil sellers 
always sell their output via the accounting system of exchange. 
In order to render this accounting system of exchange 
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operational, it is therefore necessary to introduce a market on 
which oil is traded directly aga~nst at least one other asset in 
the economy. This would give oil sellers recourse to the price 
system as a means of responding to an excess demand for oil, since 
they would now be able to demand more of the asset in exchange for . 
oil, and thereby cause the barrel of oil price of that asset to 
fall. Ceteris paribus ( that is, in the absence of changes in the 
val~e of other assets relative to that of the asset traded against 
oil), this would lead agents in the asset market to revise all 
other asset prices in terms of oil downwards. The lower ' oil 
value' of bank deposits (ie. units in an asset portfolio) would 
then imply a reduction in aggregate demand for goods and services 
as agents are less weal thy and, ultimately, a fall in the oil 
price of goods and services in general. The inclusion of an 
oil-for-asset market thus provides a means whereby the oil prices 
of assets and goods can adjust in the direction consistent with 
alleviating non-zero excess demands in the oil market 53 • 
Fama's asset market, then, in which assets are traded against 
each other, is a sufficient mechanism for establishing relative 
prices of these assets, but not for establishing barrel-of-oil 
denominated asset prices unless oil is part of this market. Given 
this linkage between the nurneraire and the assets underlying the 
accounting sys tern, exchange via this accounting system is then 
sufficient to determine the prices of all goods and services in 
53 
Note that actual trades of oil for assets are not necessary to 
establish a barrel-of-oil pr~ce for assets. The potential for such 
trades to occur is sufficient to establish market-clearing asset 
prices in terms of oil. 
66 
the economy in terms of this numeraire. The presence of a market 
in which oil is traded directly f o r some other asset is thus 
necessary and sufficient for operationality of an accounting 
system . of exchange with oil serving as the numeraire 5 4 
As noted above, nothing in our specification of this 
a c counting system actually determines that oil serves as the 
medium of account. It is possible, therefore, to envisage an 
accounting system of exchange in which the medium of account 
consists of the liabilities of the Central Bank {as under present 
monetary arrangements), and we specify such a system below. 
4.2. An Accounting System With A Central Bank 
Specification 
Assume now that we are in an unregulated financial system 
whose medium of account consists of the liabilities of the Central 
Bank (rather than oil), and that these take the form of intangible 
accounting entries55 denominated in dollars (the unit of account). 
This scenario could conceivably arise if transactions technology 
were sufficiently advanced to allow these accounting liabilities 
to function as the medium of exchange , and may be thought of as a 
s y stem in which currency is tendered and transferred exclusively 
54 I n terms of Fama's own analysis, this market satisfies his 
requirement that "to make a unit of account meaningful as the word 
used to state prices, it must be defined in terms of a real 
numeraire good that has determinate relative prices in terms of 
oth er goods" (1983:17 ; emphasis added) . 
55 As opposed to the medium of account under existing 
standards, which comprises both tangible currency and 
reserves (which take the form of accounting entries). 
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fiat 
bank 
via electronic means. Since agents routinely accept 
dollar-denominated accounting entries in exchange for goods, they 
quote prices and express contracts in terms of dollars. The Bank 
issues its (accounting) liabilities exactly as it would under 
present fiat standards, namely by standing ready to lend them at 
an announced nominal interest rate (which we call Bank rate). 
Since agents quote prices in terms of these dollar liabilities the 
Central Bank can, by changing Bank rate, influence the supply of 
its dollar liabilities and so too the dollar price level. 
Since banks are unregulated, we will assume that they offer 
dollar-denominated ' deposits' (as defined above) which provide 
access to an accounting system of exchange as described above. 
Agents hold some of their wealth in the form of these ' deposits', 
which correspond to ownership units in the underlying asset 
portfolios of banks (ie. mutual funds) , and which have a 
· fluctuating market-determined dollar value . Agents may also hold 
some of their weal th in the form of ' cash balances' , however, 
which we define here as positive holdings 0f Central Bank 
liabilities with a constant nomin~l dollar value. To make payments 
in this system, therefore, agents may tender either Central Bank 
l~abilities or mutual fund units; that is, agents c onclude 
t r ansactions by electronic transfer of a cc ounting entries which 
co rrespond either to ' cash balances' or ' deposits' , as we have 
defined them. 
Operationality 
In the payments system specified here, dollar denominated 
a ccounting liabilities issued by the Central Bank serve as medium 
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of account and medium of exchange. Dollar-denominated accounting 
entries denoting ' deposits' provided by competitive unregulated 
' banks' ( checkable mutual funds), howe ve r , also serve as a medium 
of exchange. Agents post prices for the goods they trade in terms 
of dollars, since that is the denominat ion of the payment media 
they expect to receive. An agent's r esponse to non-zero excess 
demand for his good is thus an adjustmen t in the dollar price of 
that good. 
The assets underlying the accounti ng system provided by banks 
also have market-determined prices in terms of dollars, since 
agents can purchase these assets with the accounting liabilities 
of the Central Bank. Given these market-determined (dollar) asset 
prices, agents are indifferent between receiving a ' dollar worth' 
of cash balances or deposits in exchange for goods. A crucial 
condition underlying the operationality of this accounting system, 
therefore , is that a demand exists for Central Bank liabilities as 
a medium of exchange (or means of payment). If these licibilities 
were never traded for at least one of the assets underlying the 
accounting system, it would be impossi ble to determine the dollar 
prices of assets, and hence also the d o llar prices of goods in 
general. Notice that this condition merely restates our earlier 
result that the medium of account must be tradeable directly 
against at least one of the assets underlying the accounting 
system for this system to be operational. The 
however, has a medium of account which takes 
present system, 
the form of an 
accounting entry, implying that all transactions are concluded via 
an accounting system of exchange. 
The major difference between the present system and that 
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specified in 4 .1. above is the presence of the Central Bank. By 
changing Bank rate the Central Bank can influence the supply of 
its dollar-denominated (accounting) liabilities, and thereby 
influence the dollar price level. As under present arrangements, a 
higher Bank rate ( say) would be consistent with a reduction in 
the amount of Central Bank liabilities in ·circulation, resulting 
in a lower dollar price level. 
Conclusion 
Accounting systems of exchange as specified in this section 
are operational as long as the medium of account (or numeraire) is 
directly tradeable for at least one of the assets underlying the 
' deposits' that constitute an accounting system. These trades (or 
potential trades) are necessary and sufficient to determine unit 
of account prices in such a sy~tem. 
In existing monetary regimes the medium of account consists 
of liabilities ( ie. currency and reserves) issued exclusively by 
the Central Bank. These liabilities also function as a medium of 
exchange. It is possible, therefore, to envisage a monetary system 
in which these liabilities take the form of intangible accounting 
entries, and payments are made via an accounting system of . 
exchange. Such a system is operational as long as agents continue 
to demand Central Bank liabilites. This condition also implies, 
however, that the Central Bank has control over the price level 
( expressed in terms of these liabilities). Al though banks are 
unregulated in this payments system, they take the form of 
checkable mutual funds, thus assuring their solvency. The 
distinguishing feature of such a payments system is that the 
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transfer of accounting entries is the exclusive means of 
concluding transactions. 
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Conclusion 
All the proposed alternative monetary regimes considered by 
t h is p~per either are operational or, b y further assumption, can 
be made operational. According to our definition of 
operationality , this implies that the institutional rules which 
would constitute each proposed regime are sustainable over time in 
an economy with market pricing. On . the other hand, there are 
several instances in which we find that the regimes do not have 
the properties claimed . The main results of our analysis, which 
have been listed in the introduction to this paper, are now 
s ummarised. 
In Chapter 2 it is found that none of the alternative 
monetary regimes which are derivatives of a commodity standard , 
namel y those proposed by Hall (1982), White (1984) and Greenfield 
and Yeager (1983, 1989), have the des i rable properties claimed for 
them by their originators. Our analysis thus corroborates 
Fi scher's (1986:21) view that "any t hing that commodity money 
s c hemes can accomplish can be done mo re cheaply in a related fiat 
mo ney system". Further results are reached regarding Greenfield 
a n d Yeager's (1983 , 1989) BFH system in particular , which 
e n compasses Fisher's (1912) ' compensated' dollar, and is receiving 
s ome popular attention56 . In this system the purchasing power of a 
me dium of exchange can purportedly be kept constant over time by 
56
The Economist, for example, concludes a recent feature on 
cu rrency reform by noting that "if the world is one day going to 
hav e a common currency, this [ referring to a BFH system] might be 
the safest way of ensuring that it is a non-inflationary one" · (Jan 
6 , 1990:22) 
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making it convertible into a redemption medium (like gold, or an 
existing fiat currency) in sufficient amounts to buy some broadly 
defined consumption bundle. We show that this mechanism depends on 
observability of the prices of the goods comprising the 
consumption bundle in terms of the redemption medium. This implies 
that the redemption medium itself has to function as- a medium of 
exchange (and medium of account). Establishing an 
' inflation-proof' currency in the manner proposed by Greenfield 
and Yeager thus presupposes the continued usage of a currency 
which is not ' inflation-proof'. We also show the error in 
Green£ ield and Yeager's claim that their BFH system ' separates' 
the unit of account from the medium of exchange and thus 
eliminates the possibility of ' monetary disequilibrium'. This 
claim is incorrect since the BFH system can only ever coexist with 
a monetary regime whose unit of account and medium of exchange are 
not separated. 
In Chapter 3 we review the competitive fiduciary currency 
regime as pioposed by Hayek (1978, 1984), which has the merit of 
offering agents choice over the monetary unit they adopt for 
expressing prices and contracts, and the currency they use for the 
purposes of transacting. We confirm that such a system has the 
potential for achieving stable price levels in terms of these 
competing monetary units 
supervision by any public 
in the absence 
( political) agency 
of regulation and 
su ch as a Central 
Bank. There remains, however, the possibility of disruption of the 
payments system by banking crises, thus justifying centralised 
regulation. despite Hayek's argument to the contrary. 
In Chapter 4 the accounting system of exchange, proposed by 
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Black (1970) and described by Fama (1980), is found to be immune 
to banking ' panics' or crises. Banks in this system provide 
payments services by issuing deposits as they do today, but the 
nominal value of these 1 iabi 1 it ies f 1 u c tua tes in 1 ine with the 
nominal value of their underlying portf o lio of marketable assets. 
A fall in the value of these assets reduces the value of 
depositors 
funds on 
' units' and so too their incentive to withdraw these 
Such a 
a large scale thereby disru p ting the 
system thus removes any rationale 
payments system. 
for Central Bank 
regulation and supervision of the payments system. A role for the 
Central Bank may exist however in providing a medium of account 
(which functions also as the medium of ultimate settlement) 
comprised of its accounting liabilities. As long as a demand for 
these liabilities exists so as to define the unit of account, 
transactions can occur via an accounting system of exchange. 
all 
By 
applying monetary policy as under existing fiat standards, the 
Bank can also potentially achieve a stable price level express~d 
in the unit of account. 
Amongst the alternative monetary regimes this paper has 
considered, possibly the rr.ost preferable would be one in which 
payments si:: rvi ces are provided exc 1 usi ve ly by the ' deposits' of 
competitive mutual funds as described _by Fama (1980, 1983). This 
is the only operational system which, potentially, combines the 
two desirable properties: (i) given responsible Central Bank 
behaviour the price level can be stable and (ii) the system would 
not be susceptible to banking crises. Evidence suggests that 
financial intermediation under international deregulation is in 
any case evolving towards this system: banks actively provide 
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portfolio management services, whilst non-banks (ie. mutual funds) 
are increasingly offering access to payments services. Evolution 
towards such a monetary system would effectively undermine any 
rationale for Central Bank regulation and supervision since, taken 
to the limit, it would eliminate the possibility of banking 
crises. By contrast, a proposal such as Hayek's (1978), although 
it envisages an unregulated monetary system, nonetheless has 
features which justify such control and supervision. These 
originate in Hayek' s acceptance that banks would not all issue 
their own currencies: many banks would in fact issue fixed 
(nominal) value deposits convertible on demand into another banks' 
currency and make loans denominated in that currency. The 
informational asymmetries that exist between depositors and these 
banks, coupled with the fixed nominal value of deposits and 
nonmarketable nature of bank assets, imply that these banks would 
al ways face positive default risks and the possibi 1 i ty of bank 
'runs'. Thus while banking panics may now be unlikely to spread 
between the competing currencies, the functioning of the payments 
system may still be prone to disruption by runs on any particular 
currency. This provides the rationale for supervision57 · (by a 
Central Bank), although Hayek himself denies this possibility58 . 
57 If we consider the efficient functioning of a payments system to 
be a public good. 
58Hayek (1978:61) contends rather that ' secondary' banks would have 
to practice "something very close to 100% banking". 100% banking 
removes their profitability along with their risk. Alternatively, 
100% deposit insurance merely shifts the risk onto the insurers, 
while increasing the moral hazard problem associated with 
insurance. 
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The problem with Hayek's proposal, as with existing banking 
systems, is really that "the nature of bank portfolios, largely 
filled with non-marketable assets of uncertain true value held on 
the basis of nominally fixed liabilities seem remarkably 
unsuited to form the basis of our payments system" (Goodhart, 
1989:93). 
services 
A monetary system in which transactions 
were provided rather to unit holders 
( or payments) 
of collective 
investment mutual funds, because it promises immunity to banking 
crises, is inherently safer than either our present system or 
Hayek's proposed alternative. If the current round of 
international deregulation can move banking systems in this 
direction, there should be little need for design of new monetary 
arrangements. 
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